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I've been trying to figure this question out for a while. University intelligence teaches a lot about statistics for probability.
However, if you read an adversary's doctrine, see how they train, watch how they fight, and get to know their commanders you can through intuition know what they will most likely do before they do it.
So which method provides the best juice for the squeeze?
I feel like one is based on field work and the other is put together by academics to make intelligence a science.
Great question for sure, I don't think anyone has a solid answer. Every nation's intel doctrine is shaped by their experiences. Unfortunately for the US, our doctrine has largely ignored our adversaries for a long time. The past 40 years of COIN, with few victories, have resulted in an intel culture that is not especially understanding of our adveraries. The fact that very few people writing the high-level doctrine have combat experience speaks to how most intel doctrine is a swing and a miss. Like you mention, a lot of people treat it like a science, as if intel can be effective without understanding the enemy. In reality, effective intelligence is comprised of both doctrines, a hyperawareness of the enemy, and also science/process driven.
Where do you think the rubber meets the road?
I think when Yuri Totrov developed his 26 indicators that a person working out of an embassy was a CIA operative it was done by first understanding the CIA as an organization and then looking for patterns of behaviour that provided an indicator. Although each one was meaningless on it's own they became cumulative over time until the evidence was overwhelming. But I wouldn't say - that's Bayesian Statistics at it's best. I think the probability in this type of case is more of an abstraction then a statistical model.
I feel the same with Early Warning and Indicators. In his documentary A Good American William Benny stated that he used five indicators to tell if the Russians would invade another country. He used similar indicators to provide early warning of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam (although he claimed only one commander took him seriously.)
In each case I believe a structured analytical technique was used, so that other people could follow the work, but I don't think current structured analytical techniques would of been capable of doing the same work.
Anyways. I appreciate your answer.